Psicología social: fundamentos y fundamentalismos by Lima, Marcus Eugênio Oliveira
ISSN 1413-389X Trends in Psychology / Temas em Psicologia – 2014, Vol. 22, nº 1, 179-193
 DOI: 10.9788/TP2014.1-14
Social Psychology: Fundamentals and Fundamentalisms
Marcus Eugênio Oliveira Lima1
Departamento e Mestrado de Psicologia da Universidade Federal de Sergipe, 
Aracaju, Sergipe, Brasil
Abstract
This manuscript proposes a theoretical analysis of the lack of contact between the different social psy-
chologies existing in Brazil. We present two viewpoints that characterize extreme positions in the dis-
cipline, on the one hand a more empirical social psychology; on the other a social psychology predomi-
nantly theoretical and anti-empirical. Lack of contact feeds stereotypes and prejudices, which, in turn, 
create a vicious cycle that creates and expands differentiation between groups, feeding ethnocentric 
blindness. In conclusion we propose that the lack of contact between the more empiricist social psychol-
ogy and the critical social psychology renders the fi rst irrelevant and the second dogmatic, with wide 
repercussions for the area’s bibliographic production, the formal training of social psychologists, and 
professional meetings. 
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Psicologia Social: Fundamentos e Fundamentalismos
Resumo
Este manuscrito se constitui numa proposta de análise teórica de algumas das consequências da falta de 
contato entre as diferentes psicologias sociais existentes no Brasil. Propomos dois eixos que confi gu-
ram posições extremadas na disciplina, de um lado uma psicologia social mais empírica; de outro, uma 
psicologia social predominantemente teórica e anti-empírica. A falta de contato alimenta estereótipos e 
preconceitos, os quais, por sua vez, criam o ciclo-vicioso que constrói e amplia as diferenciações entre 
os grupos, alimentando a cegueira etnocêntrica. Finalmente, propomos que a falta de contato entre a 
psicologia social mais empirista com a psicologia social crítica torna a primeira irrelevante e a segunda 
dogmática, com amplas repercussões na produção bibliográfi ca da área, na formação dos psicólogos 
sociais e nos congressos profi ssionais. 
Palavras-chave: Psicologia Social, tensionamento, articulação e desenvolvimento.
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Psicología Social: Fundamentos y Fundamentalismos
Resumen
Este manuscrito propone un análisis teórico de la falta de contacto entre las diferentes psicologías so-
ciales existentes en Brasil. Se presentan dos puntos de vista que caracterizan las posiciones extremas en 
la disciplina, por un lado, una psicología social más empírico, y por otro una psicología social predomi-
nantemente teórica y anti-empírico. La falta de contacto alimenta estereotipos y prejuicios, lo que, a su 
vez, crea un círculo vicioso que expande la diferenciación entre los grupos. En conclusión, proponemos 
que la falta de contacto entre el más empirista psicología social y la psicología social crítica hace la 
primera sufrir de falta de pertinencia y la segunda se convierte en dogmática, con amplias repercusiones 
en la producción de lo conocimiento, la capacitación formal de los psicólogos sociales y conferencias 
profesionales.
Palabras clave: Psicología Social, tensión, integración y desarrollo.
Plato, in a famous parable, tells us about 
men living in a cave, separated from the outside 
world by a wall, having access to information 
from the outside only by an opening through 
which passed a beam of light, and restricted to 
seeing only the back of the cave, where the sha-
dows from the outside are projected and where 
they hear sounds from those on the outside; the 
shadows are reality for those men. Such much 
so that if one of them was to go out one day and 
returned to recount this to the rest, he would be 
ignored or viewed as crazy, and could even be 
killed by the others2. Something in this Platonic 
allegory can help us understand what is happen-
ing in current-day Brazilian Social Psychology.
In this article, we attempt to examine some 
of the consequences of the lack of contact be-
tween social psychologies existing in Brazil. We 
intend to show that there are possible points of 
connection between them, and that the clash be-
tween their differences is necessary for the de-
velopment of psychosocial knowledge. Initially, 
we will discuss the meta-theoretical viewpoints 
that form a predominantly empirical social psy-
chology as opposed to a social psychology pre-
dominantly theoretical. The hypothesis of our 
analysis is that the lack of contact between these 
two liturgies undermines the possibilities of 
deeper psychosocial analysis on pressing issues 
of the social world.
2 Plato (trans. 1993). 
We start from the assumption that under-
taking an analysis of Brazilian social psychol-
ogy requires an understanding of its principal 
canons in the American and European social 
psychologies. In this sense, although the subject 
of our analysis is the social psychology pro-
duced in Brazil, we are interested in analyzing 
the results of the isolation of their main theoreti-
cal and methodological currents or perspectives, 
rather than undertake a detailed in-depth study 
about the various types of national psychosocial 
production.
We will analyze, on one hand, fundamen-
tals and possibilities of what is conventionally 
called “critical social psychology”, also very 
closely related in Brazil to the “Socio-historical 
Approach” (Souza & Souza, 2009), although 
there are considerable theoretical and meth-
odological differences between them3. On the 
other hand, we will focus on a more empiricist 
social psychology, inspired by Anglo-Saxon 
models. Evidently, this classifi cation simpli-
fi es and even reduces the complex and multiple 
meta-theoretical positions that constitute the 
fi eld of social psychology into only two axes, 
3 Particularly in the case of the socio-historical 
followers of Vygotsky’s approach. For many of 
them, constructionism leans close to the bourgeois 
ideals they criticize. In this regard, see the book 
by Newton Duarte (2001), Vygotsky and learning 
to learn: Critique of neoliberal and postmodern 
appropriations of Vygotskyan theory (2nd ed.). 
Campinas, SP: Campinas Autores Associados.
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empiricist and constructionist. Nevertheless, we 
take the didactic liberty to cite one type of social 
psychology more centered on hypothesis test-
ing, and another more focused on understanding 
the processes of meaning and language.
Even so, we know that there are no pure 
positions, and that they form a continuum much 
more than a dichotomy. This does not preclude, 
however, each of these axes from considering it-
self as a bearer of truths from the outside world, 
and pari-passu, considering the other as being 
contaminated by shadows and by error (Gergen, 
2002).
We will argue further on about the pro-
cesses of differentiation in social psychology 
in Brazil, with the aim of demonstrating that 
the antagonistic positions already in place have 
hindered the development of the area, and that 
many of the constructed distinctions are sus-
tained by prejudiced simplifi cation processes, 
since both empiricism and constructionism have 
similar epistemological origins (Jost & Kruglan-
ski, 2002). Then, fi nally, considering that social 
psychology would gain much by the theoretical 
and methodological pluralism that the encoun-
ter between these meta-theories would produce, 
we present a proposal for a dialogic tensioning 
between these positions toward confi guring an 
effective psychosocial space.
Differences and Differentiations: 
Common Origins and Divergent 
Practices
Clifford Geertz opens his chapter on Jerome 
Bruner’s contributions to psychology thus:
From the outside at least, psychology does 
not seem like a single fi eld, divided into 
schools and specialties in the usual way. It 
looks like an assortment of disparate and 
unconnected inquiries, classed together be-
cause they all make reference in some way 
or other to something or other called “men-
tal functioning”. Dozens of characters in 
search of a play. (Geertz, 2001, p. 166)4
4 Our translation.
This seems like a good portrait of the situ-
ation of psychology in general, and of social 
psychology in particular. To be sure, we cannot 
even speak of social psychology in the singular, 
as we run the risk of being misunderstood. Bet-
ter “social psychologies”, some more in the style 
of the American school, what is conventionally 
called “psychological social psychology”; others 
in the European fashion, the “sociological social 
psychology” (Farr, 1999). Or even, complicat-
ing things further, one from the German school, 
“the critical social psychology”, another from 
the British school with a run through France, 
“discursive social psychology” style, and yet an-
other from the Russian school, “the socio-histor-
ical psychology” (Alvaro & Garrido, 2006; Rey, 
2004; Sá, 2013).
In this scenario, it is common that the so-
cial psychology congresses defi ne themselves as 
theoretical-methodological churches where the 
faithful of a given perspective fl ock, and from 
which those of other faiths “run like the devil 
from the cross”. They never meet, except some-
times in airport lobbies or in departments in their 
universities, but try to speak in amenities so as 
to maintain good relations. As Doise (2002, p. 
27) relates:
Even when, in the same meeting, these dif-
ferent fl ocks are represented, the usual prac-
tice of symposia and workshops running in 
parallel allows the representatives of the 
different persuasions to not meet, remain-
ing among their coreligionists, and if I may 
say so, thus avoiding religious wars. Such 
situations allow the attack on divergent po-
sitions, without any appearance by the op-
position5.
In Brazil, the radicalization among the me-
ta-theoretical schools and positions marked the 
establishment of the psychosocial fi eld from the 
start (Camino & Torres, 2011). In our country, 
the positions are so radicalized that they pro-
duced, on one hand, a social psychology that is 
ashamed of psychology, anti-psychological in its 
essence, and often anti-empiricist in its practice; 
5 Our translation.
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and on the other, a social psychology that ignores 
the contributions of social science, anti-socio-
logical, micro-theoretical, and often atheoretical. 
Two leading fi gures in the creation of Brazilian 
Social Psychology, Aroldo Rodrigues and Silvia 
Lane, are emblematic of this phenomenon and 
are notable even today as the main authorities in 
the fi eld (Lima & Techio, 2013). 
As already mentioned, there are, in this par-
oxysm, many intermediate positions; pure cases 
being rare. Nevertheless, the radicalization of 
positions created the psychological and politi-
cal conditions for affi liation and non-affi liation 
with the theoretical-methodological possibilities 
that were presented in the arena of social psy-
chology’s emergence in Brazil. A typical case of 
intergroup confl ict that social psychology itself 
can help us understand.
As Henri Tajfel (1983) relates, analyzing 
the relationship between intergroup confl ict and 
construction of social images and identities, one 
of the main socio-cognitive consequences of the 
categorization of the social world into “us” and 
“them” is the simplistic perception that “they”, 
the others from the other group, are all equal 
to each other, and at the same time, worse than 
“us”, who are better and unique. This process 
constitutes the cognitive soil to the emergence 
of ethnocentrism, stereotyping and prejudice 
against difference. Lévi-Strauss (1952/2000) as-
serts that when we are put in unexpected situa-
tions, our more usual attitude is one that purely 
and simply repudiates the cultural, moral, reli-
gious, social, and aesthetic forms furthest from 
those with which we identify.
In fact, our short history shows that each 
of the Brazilian social psychologies tends to 
repudiate the other as “barbaric”, because it 
does not share the same theoretical and method-
ological assumptions. However, as Lévi-Strauss 
(1952/2000, p. 19) himself relates: “The barbar-
ian is, fi rst of all, the one who believes in barba-
rism”. We do not deny that there are important 
differences between the social psychologies. 
However, we argue that there are also many dif-
ferentiations, that is, processes that fabricate and 
overvalue the differences.
According to Jost and Kruglanski (2002), 
the main difference between constructionist-
inspired social psychology and more empiricist 
social psychology lies in the notion of “repre-
sentation of reality”. For the constructionists, 
such representations are arbitrary and relative. 
They feel that reality and knowledge about it are 
discursive practices. Such that the problems the 
“scientists” encounter can often be better inves-
tigated by artists and even journalists, than by 
theorists. As Woodiwiss (1990, p. 3) relates, 
describing post-structuralism: “By contrast, ac-
cording to the theory of meaning fi rst posited by 
Saussure, words (including the theories) do not 
represent extralinguistic realities”. The criticism, 
therefore, is not aimed at the term “representa-
tion” in itself, but at the possibility that scientifi c 
knowledge may be a representation of reality. 
The empiricists, however, believe that it is pos-
sible to produce knowledge or representation of 
a reality that is not limited to discourse, that is 
extra-discursive. They are in search of data that 
represent reality, in the most verisimilar and ac-
curate manner, quite often adopting probabilistic 
models toward this end.
Although representationism may be a 
marked difference between these paradigms, 
there is also a fundamental similarity between 
them, their origin. According to Jost and Krug-
lanski (2002), the central assumptions of the two 
perspectives arise from the same ground, and 
stem from philosophers such as Marx, Hegel, 
Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Cooley, Dewey and 
Mead, who inspired both the more empirical 
analyses as well as those more speculative and 
subjective: “In this sense, the intellectual origin 
of empiricist psychology and of construction-
ist psychology is essentially the same” (Jost & 
Kruglanski, 2002, p. 170). It is important to note 
that there are other fundamental philosophical 
references, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Wittgenstein, that mark important distinctions.
Jerome Bruner and Vygotsky are notable 
references for this possibility of common origin 
and contact between the empiricist and construc-
tionist paradigms in social psychology. Bruner 
worked in almost all lines of thought. He was 
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one of those responsible for the cognitive rev-
olution, creating along with Goodman in the 
1940s, the “new look in perception”, a move-
ment that inaugurates social cognition, the main 
axis of the more empiricist social psychology 
even today. Before that, he had worked with 
rats in maze learning activities. Later he became 
disenchanted with cognitivism, upon thinking 
that it had become too technical, and became 
interested in cultural psychology, trying to un-
derstand how individuals engage in processes 
of sharing meanings, beliefs, and values already 
established in society, focusing on the social 
production of meaning, and proposing the analy-
sis of narratives as a method (Bruner, 1990; see 
also Geertz, 2001). Vygotsky (1996), integrat-
ing infl uences of Darwin, Marx, Durkheim, and 
Köhler, through ingenious experiments, ana-
lyzes the importance of the other in the devel-
opment of inner speech or thought in children, 
and creates a fi eld of fundamental infl uence for 
constructionism, the socio-historical approach.
But, although there is no marked difference 
in the origin of the paradigms, there is great dif-
ference in their practices, as is stated by Kenneth 
Gergen, a leading fi gure of constructionism. Ac-
cording to this author, the most important diffe-
rence between constructionist and empiricist so-
cial psychologists is found on a meta-theoretical 
level. Constructionism would be rooted in the 
sociology of knowledge and in the history of sci-
ence, while empirism would be based on expe-
rimentalism (Gergen, 2002). However, despite 
this difference between the two paradigms, Ger-
gen himself states that closer relations between 
them would be benefi cial for both, and for social 
psychology as a whole:
Empiricist philosophers have rightfully 
avoided any proposals for submitting em-
piricist foundations to empirical test. How 
could empirical methods be used to falsify 
the grounds on which they rest? In addition, 
most constructionists would agree that con-
structionist views of knowledge are them-
selves the outcome of social negotiation. In 
fact, philosophers in general have largely 
abandoned the attempt to secure a univer-
sal “foundation” of knowledge . . . . We 
might fruitfully discontinue the mad rush 
to a higher ground and begin to ask about 
the relative merits of differing perspectives. 
(Gergen, 2002, p. 189)
Indeed, the merits of each of these views 
of the world and of knowledge would gain in 
strength if they were to engage in more contact. 
We will address this point in the next section.
The Etiology of Prejudice:                   
Ignorance and Lack of Contact
In the relations between social groups, so-
cial psychology has shown, since the 1950s, that 
the lack of contact feeds stereotypes and preju-
dices, which, in turn, create a vicious cycle that 
amplifi es the differences between the groups and 
feeds confl ict (Lima, 2011). However, social 
psychology itself is a victim of the phenomenon 
that it describes so well.
The lack of contact between the dominant 
paradigms weakens the two perspectives and can 
be one of the causes of the fact that social psy-
chology has never produced a theory with social 
impact, as did, for example, Freud and Skinner. 
For Gergen (1978), social psychology has not 
been very successful in producing an intellectual 
revolution that affects our conceptions of nature 
or the human condition.
In the more empiricist psychology, the lack 
of contact with critical approaches has generated 
micro-theorizing and little theoretical creati-
vity or inventiveness. According to Kruglanski 
(2001), the main negative consequences of the 
theoretical shyness of empiricist social psycho-
logy can be seen in practices such as: (a) inven-
ting new names for old concepts, (b) fragmenta-
tion of the fi eld, (c) loss of value and interest, 
and (d) isolation in the dialogue with other 
knowledge areas.
Inventing new names for old phenomena 
amounts to re-christening concepts in order to 
pose as discoverers and creators of a theory. For 
example, in the fi eld of theories about preju-
dice, Social Dominance Theory – SDT (Sida-
nius, 1993) was recently created, and with it, 
the interest in a phenomenon or psychological 
trait, social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sida-
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nius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). However, in 
the 1950s, the sociologist Herbert Blumer had 
already formulated the Theory of the Sense of 
Group Position (Blumer, 1958), whose assump-
tions are identical to those of SDT. Another ex-
ample is the Theory of Benevolent Sexism, by 
Glick and Fiske (2001), which already appears 
in the sociological description by Mary Jackman 
(1994) on paternalism. Each of us could make 
an effort and search within their fi elds, for social 
psychology theories that are original and have 
brought innovative contributions in recent times. 
Clearly, we have no wish to detract from the 
merit of these psychosocial theories on provid-
ing empirical support to the theories of Blumer 
and Jackman. However, this seems a trifl e for a 
fi eld as vast as social psychology.
The fragmentation of the fi eld is related to 
Social Psychology’s diffi culties in connecting 
with other knowledge domains, thus becoming 
a discipline whose explanations for phenomena 
usually involve a broad and diverse set of factors 
that are often contradictory. For example, in the 
area of current psychosocial theories to explain 
interpersonal attraction, a researcher can formu-
late both the hypothesis that similarity generates 
attraction, as well as the opposite hypothesis, 
that difference is the cause of attraction. For both 
statements, there is broad confi rmatory empiri-
cal evidence (McGuire, 1973).
Another limitation that the lack of contact or 
dialogue between the social psychologies carries 
is the decline in value and interest. To check the 
validity of this assertion, we need simply ask our 
students to read the articles published in journals 
of the area, especially the most infl uential, and 
then tell us to what extent, in general, they are in-
teresting. Such an assessment was already taken 
on texts published in the Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, by Kay Deaux in 1988, 
and the most frequent response was: “journal ar-
ticles are no longer interesting” (cited Kruglan-
ski, 2001, p. 873).
Finally, the isolation of the broader cultural 
dialogue is another limitation of social psychol-
ogy closed in upon itself (Kruglanski, 2001). 
The author proposes that this leads researchers 
to a reluctance toward theorizing and venturing 
beyond their data or assumptions, which makes 
the voice of this social psychology barely heard 
and of slight infl uence in the intellectual debate 
on social issues. Gergen (1978) also discusses 
“theoretical timidity” as one of the limitations of 
social psychology. To him, many of our theo-
ries fail for lack of generative power (i.e. do not 
demonstrate a capacity to challenge prevailing 
beliefs about social life, or are unable to offer 
alternatives to contemporary standards of con-
duct).
In this regard, one needs only to take a 
look at the articles published by the two lead-
ing journals of social psychology in Europe and 
the United States. They rarely have more than 
three pages of theory, most of the text being 
devoted to the method and the results, closing 
with a couple of pages of discussion and a much 
larger number of pages devoted to references. 
However, one could argue that these journals 
are devoted to research reports and that there 
are specifi c channels to trickle out the theoreti-
cal production of the area. That is indeed true, 
but even the journals that are dedicated to pub-
lication of theoretical papers have been going 
through a sort of crisis of content. As Kruglanski 
(2001, p. 874) tells us:
Susan Anderson, currently an associate edi-
tor at Psychological Review, admits to “hav-
ing been surprised by the large numbers of 
papers even by top notch players in the fi eld 
that are really literature reviews and don’t 
present a well-developed, internally coher-
ent theory that is in fact new” (personal 
communication, 1999). Marilynn Brewer, 
our outgoing editor of Personality and So-
cial Psychology Review (PSPR) adds that 
“submissions to PSPR have not produced 
much by way of broad, general theory”. 
(personal communication, 1999)
Even though Kruglanski’s analysis focuses 
more on one type of social psychology, it is plau-
sible to imagine that these problems also occur 
in the other social psychology, the critical. Nev-
ertheless, there are yet other limitations, these 
specifi c to the more empiricist social psychol-
ogy, that a greater openness to other theoretical 
and methodological possibilities could avoid. 
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One of these relates to the ongoing and even ex-
clusive use of college students in research stud-
ies. The vast majority of these individuals have a 
socio-demographic profi le that varies little, they 
are generally middle-class, young, white, Catho-
lic, etc. They are what Henrich, Heine and No-
renzayan (2010) call “WEIRD” (Western, very 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democrat-
ic). College students constitute 96% of the sub-
jects of the research published in the six leading 
journals in psychology, between 2003 and 2007 
(Jones, 2010).
In fact, if we consider the main European 
social psychology journal (European Journal of 
Social Psychology), among 67 articles published 
in 2011 (from the edition numbers 1-6), 62.5% 
had samples exclusively from college students 
and almost always from psychology courses. An-
other 17.2% had mixed samples and only 20.3% 
of the articles did not use this type of sample in 
their studies. That is, only one in fi ve of the arti-
cles published in the main European Social Psy-
chology Journal present studies conducted with 
ordinary citizens. This leads us to question the 
extent to which the theories produced in modern 
social psychology can be applied to other groups 
and other contexts outside the university.
The excessive use of this type of sample 
in the studies can result in misleading formula-
tions about phenomena with utmost importance, 
which carries signifi cant social risks, as Gergen 
(2002, p. 189) well observed: “When we begin 
to declare local truths as true in all worlds, we 
not only border on insensitivity, but we may 
ultimately contribute to forces of colonialism, 
oppression, and totalitarianism”. Less dramati-
cally, Henrich et al. (2010) show that even the 
perception of physical stimuli varies culturally; 
to cite just one example, the Muller-Lyer illu-
sion, which concerns the belief that line A is 
shorter than line B, is more frequently perceived 
among subjects from industrialized societies 
than in less industrialized societies.
Again we can draw an example of these 
risks from our area of research. The Theory of 
Aversive Racism formulated by Gaertner and 
Dovidio (1986) states that when people are con-
fronted with inter-racial contact situations in 
which the appropriate response is clear, in which 
right and wrong are clearly defi ned, aversive 
racists do not discriminate against Blacks (see 
Lima, 2011). Empirical evidence of this theory 
shows that in situations of job candidate selec-
tion, Blacks will only suffer discrimination in re-
lation to Whites when both have median qualifi -
cations for the position; in situations of high and 
low qualifi cation, as the responses to hire or not 
are clearly defi ned by the norm, racism will not 
be a factor (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). How-
ever, Quillian (2006), using data from American 
employment agencies concerning hiring that oc-
curred between 1994 and 2003, shows that real 
life is not like that. The accounts from business 
owners indicate that Whites are hired 2.43 times 
more than Blacks when the interview is face-to-
face, and 1.5 times more when the interview is 
by computer, even when all candidates have the 
same level of schooling.
Thus, we can conclude that the data from 
Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) derive from the ir-
relevance of the activity for American college 
students who, when responding to hiring simula-
tions, attempt to show they are not prejudiced. 
Whereas the businessmen surveyed, when placed 
in a real situation, prefer to hire Whites over 
Blacks, and probably have justifi cations suppos-
edly unbiased against Blacks, as demonstrated in 
other studies (e.g., Pereira, 2007; Pereira, Tor-
res, & Almeida, 2003; Pereira & Vala, 2011).
Another marked limitation in the fi eld of 
current empirical social psychology stems from 
an experimental research model that is formatted 
not to test hypotheses, but to confi rm them. In 
Brazil, this aspect of the experimental methods in 
social psychology has always been approached 
from the perspective of an exorcist trying to cast 
out the devil (experiment) from the sinful posi-
tivist body (social psychology; e.g., Tittoni & 
Jacques, 1998). However, the biggest problem 
of experimental research in social psychology is 
far from being the supposed belief in the neutral-
ity of knowledge; it relies much more on the lack 
of openness to error, and perhaps even on the 
current lack of neutrality in the method.
William McGuire (1973), analyzing ex-
perimental research in social psychology over 
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the course of time, states that formerly this 
method was creative and critical. We need only 
to recall the experiments of Muzafer Sherif on 
the relation between competition, stigma, and 
prejudice, those of Vygotsky on inner speech in 
children, those of Henri Tajfel on social iden-
tity; and even the quasi-experiments of Lu-
ria on the relation between the perceptions of 
geometric shapes and the cultural insertion of 
groups, and along the same line, those of Bruner 
and Goodman, or even the study by Bartlett on 
culture and memory, and by Asch on the size 
of the lines, just to name a few. However, for 
McGuire, more recent experimental research 
fails to account for the complexity of the psy-
chosocial processes and even further, eventually 
constitutes an exercise of confi rming theories, 
losing its essential function of hypothesis test-
ing: “The crux of this objection is that we, social 
psychologists, have tended to use the manipula-
tional laboratory experiment not to test our hy-
potheses but to demonstrate their obvious truth” 
(McGuire, 1973, p. 448).
Actually, all those who have done experi-
mental studies know that if the “results are not 
found” (i.e., if the hypotheses or theoretical 
assumptions are not confi rmed, the research is 
not suitable for publication in the area’s major 
journals). Who of us has read, in the European 
Journal of Social Psychology or in the Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, reports 
of wretched researchers who went about not 
confi rming their hypotheses. The stories are all 
successes, the empirical evidence always ap-
pears; either due to the use of a statistical appa-
ratus so sophisticated that at some point the data 
will have to confess what is expected of them, 
or because the experiment will be repeated with 
other subjects (usually paid for their responses), 
using other procedures and instruments until the 
hypothesis is fi nally confi rmed. In fact, among 
those aforementioned 67 articles published in 
the European Journal of Social Psychology in 
2011, 58.2% were experimental studies and they 
all confi rmed their hypotheses.
It is not without cause, as we have seen, 
that we can have diametrically opposed hypoth-
eses on the same phenomenon and both will be 
confi rmed; because what is being tested, basi-
cally, are not hypotheses, but the ability of the 
researcher to confi rm them: “If the experiment 
does not come out ‘right’, then the researcher 
does not say that the hypothesis is wrong but 
rather that something was wrong with the ex-
periment” (McGuire, 1973, p. 449).
This phenomenon has most varied conse-
quences, both epistemological and ethical. In 
2011, European social psychology was con-
fronted with a scandalous case of fraud. Dutch 
researcher Diederik Stapel confessed to have 
faked his laboratory data, inventing information 
that was published in dozens of major scientifi c 
journals. Altogether, 30 articles in respected sci-
entifi c journals included data created by Stapel. 
One explanation for the non-discovery of the 
researcher’s frauds was the lack of scientifi c 
criticism6. However, in order to understand what 
leads a researcher to falsify data, it may be im-
portant to carry out, as stated by Fabrizio Butera, 
president of the European Association of Social 
Psychology in a letter to the scientifi c commu-
nity on September 9, 2011, a more systemic 
analysis, considering the culture that has been 
fostered on what is “good research” and what is 
“a good researcher” in the extremely competi-
tive research scenario in which we live today. It 
is in this direction that Eric-Jan Wagenmakers 
states:
But when we do our statistics, we feel the 
same pressure to publish, we are subject to 
the same confi rmation biases, and I doubt 
that we can lay claim to a higher morality. 
I suspect, therefore, that we torture the data 
just as much as social psychologists do.7
If we combine this eagerness to confi rm 
hypotheses with the assertions about theoretical 
timidity, lack of generative theories, or the cur-
rent sterility of the theoretical fi eld in social psy-
chology, then we have a disheartening scenario, 
in which processes occurring under certain re-
search conditions, generally in middle-class 
6 For more details see http://m.rnw.nl/portugues/
node/85887
7 For more details see http://www.ejwagenmakers.
com/2012/Wagenmakers2012Horrors.pdf
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college students, turn into the self-confi rmatory 
theories that structure knowledge in the area and 
generate “new” studies, which are conducted to 
confi rm old assumptions.
All of this has an impact on the professional 
training of students and researchers in social 
psychology. They do not learn about how to for-
mulate good hypotheses, and proceed to neglect 
the knowledge of classical texts by reading ar-
ticles that never have more than four pages of 
theory, and therefore teach nothing about how to 
theorize. This generally involves students with 
lots of statistical or technical resourcefulness, 
but with low critical thinking on the theory be-
ing embraced, and little creativity for changing 
it. Students who attend the same scientifi c con-
gress as their advisors, where they will discuss 
and hear basically what they have already heard 
and discussed at their universities.
But will the situation of the construction-
ist analyses, which have emerged as a scathing 
criticism of this empiricist psychology, be a bet-
ter world?
Woodiwiss (1990), analyzing the impact of 
postmodernism on social theory, states that by 
having abandoned realism, postmodernists have 
restricted their analyses to criticism about partic-
ular concepts (e.g., class, society, identity), have 
affi rmed the illusory nature of the theories about 
these phenomena, but have ignored the concept 
that knowledge itself, as a set of discursive prac-
tices, is a social fact, for it has a materiality and 
therefore can be observed and described. In the 
words of Woodiwiss (1990, p. 9):
By refusing what might be termed “the rush 
to representation” we could imagine that 
this would enhance the likelihood of a fruit-
ful union between theory and observation, 
in which the role of observation was to con-
trol abstraction rather than to initiate, verify, 
or falsify it.
However, that was not quite what happened 
with constructionism, which generally was lim-
ited to criticism. Weinberg (2008) declares that 
the almost exclusive commitment to deconstruct 
intellectual projects may refl ect a certain philo-
sophical immaturity in the constructionist move-
ment. According to this author, constructionist 
research can not avoid the performative assump-
tion that to be about something, the imagination 
has to encounter reality; analyzing language 
does not exempt us from considering the objec-
tivity of things. Such that, reading brilliant writ-
ers like Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, and Rorty 
leads the constructionist movement to devalue 
the scientifi c descriptions of social phenomena 
in favor of literary and philosophical narratives 
(Weinberg, 2008). But we must take into ac-
count, as Habermas teaches us, that replacing the 
reasonableness of an argument with its beauty 
is to produce sustenance for the demagogues. 
Thus: “Although our judgment criteria often in-
tersect, it remains important to differentiate the 
beauty of the argument from its empirical sub-
stantiality” (Weinberg, 2008, p. 32).
In the same direction, Jost and Kruglan-
ski (2002) argue that considering the “truth” as 
a product of scientifi c activity is different than 
considering the “truth” as an ideal or guide of 
epistemic activity. In such a manner that the 
constructionist theses on language games and 
their criticism of meta-narratives and universal-
ist ontologies should be empirically analyzed in 
constructionist terms (Gergen, 2002; Weinberg, 
2008).
There is also some contradiction in the an-
ti-foundationalism of constructionism, as this 
is often advocated by the followers of this ap-
proach as the most correct epistemological po-
sition. However, as Castañon (2004) questions, 
on what basis can one assert the epistemological 
superiority of a given way of thinking, if there 
are no secure foundations to assess any knowl-
edge? Furthermore, Méllo, Silva, Lima, and Di 
Paolo (2007), citing one of the Gurus of con-
structionism in Brazil, Lupicinio Íñiguez, ques-
tion whether constructionism in social psychol-
ogy still retains all its original rebelliousness or 
has already become a new form of orthodoxy, 
adopting the same practices of exclusion of the 
different that it suffered when it fi rst appeared.
Ideologically, there are other contradictions 
in constructionism that generate ambivalences 
in their analyses which deserve mention. We 
have heard many times that poststructuralist ap-
proaches are aligned with libertarian ideals of 
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social equality, of the fi ght against the establish-
ment, which form a position to the left on the 
political spectrum (see Hepburn, 2003); or even 
that qualitative analyses, which characterize this 
meta-theory, are liberating, as opposed to quan-
titative analyses focused on control (for a cri-
tique see Bauer & Gaskell, 2002).
However, in the philosophical heart of con-
structionism, in particular its founding idea that 
external reality is unknowable, is a legacy of the 
political right, deriving from the Idealism and 
skepticism of Berkeley, Descartes, Hume, Kant, 
and Hegel, as opposed to Marxist ideas (Jost & 
Hardin, 1996; Weinberg, 2008). This ideological 
ambivalence generates internal contradictions 
that are refl ected in practice: “The philosophi-
cal implication is that people are not really op-
pressed, but they think they are. This turns the 
perception of injustice into just one among many 
equally (in)valid social constructs” (Jost & Kug-
lanski, 2002, p. 175).
Camargo (2012), citing an internal criticism 
of the constructionist paradigm, produced by 
Bruno Latour, states that often the relativism of 
the critical approach to science is co-opted by 
conservative, religious, and fundamentalist ide-
ologies; in such a way that 
the danger, in this case, comes not from ide-
ological arguments presented as facts, but 
from excessive distrust of matters in fact 
reasonable, disguised as reprehensible ideo-
logical biases . . . . In short, we may criticize 
Reason, without forgetting that its sleep, as 
Goya put it, produces monsters. (Camargo, 
2012, p. 16)
In Brazil, constructionism was more in-
spired by the ideas of Foucault, Lacan, Derrida, 
Deleuze and Guatari, with emphasis on radical 
criticism of the hegemonic modes of addressing 
subjectivity and the processes of subjectifi cation 
(Dimenstein, 2000; Leite & Dimenstein, 2002) 
and their relationship with modernity (Mancebo, 
2002). Constructionism in Brazil largely aban-
dons the frameworks of discursive psychology 
(e.g., Billig, 2008; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) 
and American constructionism (e.g., Gergen 
1973, 1978, 1994), to adopt a perspective mark-
edly anti-psychologizing. Indeed, just hearing 
the word “psychologizing” causes hives to many 
local constructionists. This brought to social 
psychology a kind of theorizing that ignores the 
classic texts of psychology in general, and social 
psychology in particular.
In fact, if we look at the book “Psicologia 
Social Contemporânea” [Contemporary So-
cial Psychology], published in 1998, in several 
chapters there is hardly any classic work of psy-
chology cited. In the chapter about identity, for 
example, from the classical and recent authors 
of social psychology on identity, only George 
Mead is cited, taking up two lines of text, fol-
lowed immediately in the next sentence by the 
statement that the naturalist, essentialist, and 
maturationist perspectives of identity were ques-
tioned in contemporary approaches (Jacques, 
1998). There is no mention of the theories of so-
cial identity of the Bristol and Geneva Schools 
or even of the constructionist theories of identity 
in social psychology, such as those of Gergen or 
from the Discourse Analysis group in England. 
As we read the chapter, we get the feeling that it 
is the fi rst time a social psychologist writes about 
this topic.
We think the anti-empiricism and anti-
psychologism that characterize construction-
ist social psychology in Brazil held its political 
importance, for opposing an individualistic so-
cial psychology and for opening a new scenario 
where a more critical psychology fl ourished, 
with a broader vision of the social (Silva, 2004). 
However, theoretically and methodologically, 
it is a stance as empty or shallow as the anti-
sociologism of the other radicalized perspective. 
For Moscovici (1990), a “psychologizing analy-
sis”, in academic parlance, means a reduction-
ist analysis; while a “sociologizing analysis” is 
a compliment, a reference to a broad and com-
plex approach. Nevertheless, there is no more 
analytical power in one than in the other, both 
are reductionist. Moscovici (1990, p. 19) quotes 
Thomas Mann to brilliantly illustrate this move-
ment of repudiating the psychological:
Psychology, mercy, you’re still at it? This 
is but a nineteenth-century bourgeois affl ic-
tion! Our age is woefully saturated with it, 
soon we will have a violent fi t of choler at 
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the mere word “psychology”, and whoever 
disturbs life by involving oneself in psy-
chology will simply receive a blow to the 
skull.
From our point of view, the anti-psycholo-
gism of constructionism in Brazil impoverished 
the internal debate on social psychology and 
eventually helped turn our main scientifi c con-
gresses into a theoretical-methodological cor-
poration with a single voice. Illustrative of this 
phenomenon, the Revista Psicologia & Socie-
dade [Psychology & Society Journal], the lead-
ing journal in the area, had proposed in 2012 a 
special issue in English, for which critical social 
psychology was defi ned as an approach to be ad-
opted by the authors: “A call was made for con-
tributions that carried out, from the theoretical 
framework of critical social psychology, analy-
ses and refl ections on the problems and context 
of the Brazilian and Latin American societies” 
(Mayorga, Rasera, & Prado, 2012, p. 492).
Once again, the exaggeration of positions 
has an impact on the education of our students 
and future researchers. On this side of the Equa-
tor they usually become “amateur sociologists or 
philosophers” with little reading of classic texts 
of general and social psychology, and with co-
lossal prejudices against all research that is not 
qualitative, and sometimes even against any re-
search. They are students of the great debates, of 
the grand discussions, of the great themes. Ama-
teur sociologists because they know how to cite 
the names in fashion; even though, with the huge 
schedule of psychology disciplines they follow, 
they do not manage to study them in more depth. 
They are probably already like their most infl u-
ential teachers, choosing psychology, they will 
become psychologists, but do not accept this 
terrible label. They attend the same scientifi c 
congresses as their advisors, where they hear the 
same things as said in their research meetings at 
home, in a movement of self-legitimation. As 
Sá (2013) relates, social psychology can not be 
done solely with psychology; but it also can not 
be done without it.
Everything that has been mentioned also 
has an impact on the theorizing produced by 
constructionism in social psychology. In this 
respect we can inquire about which theory or 
fi gure from our fi eld has emerged with an im-
pact on the analysis of social phenomena. If we 
adopt one of the concepts “under erasure” in the 
postmodern perspective that inspires construc-
tionism, that of “identity”, a fundamental con-
cept in social psychology, we observe that the 
timely criticism employed by constructionism 
against more essentialist notions of identity did 
not produce signifi cant theoretical alternatives to 
the topic. As one of the inspirers of the approach 
declares: “The very concept with which we are 
dealing, ‘identity’, is overly complex, too poorly 
developed, and too little understood in contem-
porary social science to be defi nitively put to the 
test” (Hall, 2006, p. 8).
A number of ethnographic accounts tell us 
that cultural isolation is mainly responsible for 
the backwardness, barbarity, and ignorance in 
societies in general. In social psychology it is 
no different. We think that the tensioning be-
tween different ways of thinking is what is most 
benefi cial for the production of knowledge in a 
world without absolute or neutral frames of ref-
erence. However, to produce contact it is neces-
sary that the differences be engaged, included in 
dialogue, and acknowledged. This would permit 
a theoretical and methodological pluralism in so-
cial psychology that would bring many benefi ts 
to this area of knowledge, in general, and to the 
perspectives that constitute it, in the specifi c. It 
is this point, the possibilities of dialogue, that we 
will discuss next.
Proposal for a New Field:                  
Articulation and Tensioning
Gergen (2002), a leading reference on con-
structionism in psychology, asserts that there 
are no rational grounds for an endless struggle 
between empiricism and constructionism. The 
encounter of these perspectives is essential to 
the development of our area. Redding (2001) 
proposes that the lack sociopolitical diversity in 
psychology has brought negative consequences 
for research, clinical practice, professional train-
ing, and social intervention. According to this 
author, the marginalization of opposing political 
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positions, in various fi elds, does huge damage to 
our knowledge.
In the case of studies on prejudice, for ex-
ample, the hegemony of political leftist thought 
among researchers has often led psychosocial 
research to confuse attitudes contrary to Affi r-
mative Action Policies with racism (e.g., Kinder 
& Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986). At the op-
posite extreme, excessive conservatism of the 
right, dominant in other areas of the fi eld may, 
for example, lead us to theorize about child de-
velopment based on a traditional family model 
with a father, a mother, and children, ignoring 
other possibilities.
Not only the contrast of various political po-
sitions, but also of different styles and epistemo-
logical beliefs could benefi t our area. As Geertz 
(2001, p. 176) states, in his reading of Bruner:
The path of our understanding of the mind 
does not reduce to a determined march to-
ward an omega point where everything fi -
nally harmoniously fi ts; it is based on the re-
peated exposure of separate investigations, 
in such a way so that, again and again, in a 
seemingly endless manner, they require pro-
found reconsiderations of one another. . . . 
What seems necessary is the development of 
strategies that allow different constructs of men-
tal reality, in the words of Bruner, to confront, 
decompose, energize, and de-provincialize each 
other, leading the venture erratically forward.
The aim, then, is not to reconcile approach-
es, integrating them as levels, assuming that 
some explain the basics and others the complex. 
The proposal is to place them in confrontation, 
stressing them through one another (Geertz, 
2001). What is sought is not the eclectic and 
peaceful social psychologist; but the one uneasy, 
unsure of his/her assumptions, open and even 
prone to new possibilities of understanding.
Michael Burawoy (2009), in his discussion 
of the levels of analysis in sociology and their 
relation to practice, helps us to form a proposal 
for a dialogue between the psychologies more 
empiricist and those more constructionist. This 
author, by considering one type of knowledge 
production instrumental and another refl exive, 
and considering the type of clientele to whom the 
knowledge is directed, proposes the existence of 
a scenario of sociologies that complement each 
other, as we can see in Table 1.
Table 1




Instrumental Knowledge Professional Sociology Policy Sociology
Refl exive Knowledge Critical Sociology Public Sociology
Note. Extracted from Burawoy, 2009, p. 236.
According to Burawoy (2009), public so-
ciology arises from direct contact, without me-
diation, between the sociologist and the public, 
from which arise theorizations about the connec-
tion between the individual micro-experience 
and the social macrostructure. Professional so-
ciology is oriented to research programs that fi t 
in a pre-defi ned theoretical framework, in which 
the thesis can not be questioned by the research-
er. To question these assumptions, the researcher 
needs another body of specialized sociologists, 
those from critical sociology. Finally, policy 
sociology is geared to solve the problems of its 
clients (e.g., the State, NGOs, politicians, trade 
unions, social movements, etc.). Thus, con-
cludes Burawoy (2009, p. 236): “As critical so-
ciology involves a dialogue among sociologists 
about the foundations of professional sociology, 
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public sociology involves a dialogue with pub-
lics beyond academia, and regarding the foun-
dations of society”. Sociological analysis cannot 
ignore the clash among these four fi elds, because 
only in this clash can sociology fl ourish. It is in 
this sense that the author defends the thesis of 
“antagonistic interdependence” between the so-
ciologies:
Professional sociology draws its energy 
from the infusions from public sociology, 
advances under the pressures of critical 
sociology, and is often sustained by policy 
sociology. Likewise, public sociology could 
not exist, unless professional sociology did 
not conform, and sustained its autonomy 
vis-à-vis the publics with which it engages. 
It also depends on critical sociology to in-
still values that may help maintain or cor-
rect its course. In turn, critical sociology 
depends on its antagonist, professional so-
ciology, without which it would have noth-
ing to criticize! All these antagonisms are 
linked in a common division of labor. To the 
extent that professional sociology becomes 
irrelevant, critical sociology becomes dog-
matic, policy sociology becomes servile, 
and public sociology becomes populism. 
(Burawoy, 2009, p. 240)
We think that the proposal presented for so-
ciology fi ts perfectly in the fi eld of social psy-
chology. In a way such that our “professional 
social psychology” empiricist does not become 
irrelevant, and the “critical social psychology” 
constructionist does not regress into dogmatism, 
we need to expand the opportunities for contrast 
and understanding between these perspectives, 
creating spaces where the different psychologies 
can effectively dialogue, as has been proposed in 
several perspectives of linkage (Camino, 1996, 
2005; Doise, 1982, 2002). Indeed, we can estab-
lish an arena of interfaces in which the more in-
tra-individual level analyses, prevailing in more 
empiricist social psychology, may be comple-
mented or contrasted with situational or interper-
sonal level analyses, focused on the infl uences 
of the immediate interactional situation; these, in 
turn, will benefi t from the emphasis on the posi-
tional level, which highlights the social status of 
the groups and the power relations established, 
and on the ideological level, considering also 
the role of the norms, social representations, and 
belief systems of each society in psychological 
processes. All of that would enrich both the pro-
duction of a more instrumental knowledge from 
a more empiricist psychology, as well as the 
criticism and adjustments of course proposed by 
constructionist psychology.
We therefore need to replace our current 
“antagonistic independence” with “antagonistic 
interdependence”. All this can make social psy-
chology have a more decisive role in its contact 
with the public and in the development and im-
plementation of public policies.
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